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This article offers a conception of semantics, and of what makes the human 
language faculty distinctive, based on five theses: Meanings are instructions 
to build concepts; concatenation calls for conjunction of monadic concepts; 
grammatical relations invoke certain thematic relations and a kind of 
existential closure; lexicalization is a partly creative process of abstraction; 
and meanings are internalistic properties of expressions. Each of these 
claims is defended elsewhere. The aim here is to connect them explicitly, 
and compare the result with alternatives, in the hope of providing a 
plausible conception of natural language meaning that coheres with 
Chomsky’s minimalist program. 
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1. Proposal: Meanings as Conjunctive Begriffsplans 
 
This paper combines five theses, each discussed in more detail elsewhere (see 
Pietroski 2002 et seq.). 
  
(1) Meanings are instructions to build concepts. 
(2) Concatenation calls for conjunction of monadic concepts. 
(3) Grammatical relations invoke certain thematic relations and a restricted 
operation of existential closure (∃-closure). 
(4) Lexicalization is a partly creative process of abstraction. 
(5) Meanings are internalistic properties of expressions.  
 
These claims, explained below, are logically independent. But they cohere, invi-
ting comparison with alternative quintets. The net result is a version of semantic 
internalism: Open-class lexical items are instructions to fetch monadic concepts 
that may have been abstracted in the course of acquisition; and the meaning of a 
phrase is an instruction to build a conjunctive monadic concept from fetchable 
elements, given a few relational/thematic concepts and an operation of exis-
tential closure. The position identified owes much to Chomsky’s (1977, 1995a, 
2000a) discussion of meaning and the general program of biolinguistics.  
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1.1. Meanings are Instructions to Build Concepts 
 
For these purposes, I take it as given that humans have a language faculty that is 
in some respects distinctively human, and that the languages human children 
naturally acquire can be described as biologically implemented procedures that 
generate expressions. Chomsky (1986) calls these procedures, which correspond 
to stable states of the faculty, I-languages. By contrast, E-languages are sets of 
expressions; even for languages with endlessly many expressions, a single E-
language might be determined by two or more generative procedures. The ‘I’/’E’ 
distinction connotes the contrast between intensions (procedures, algorithms) 
and the extensions we characterize by appeal to procedures, as when we specify 
sets without listing their elements; cf. Church (1941). 
 Using this terminology, we can describe the Human Faculty of Language 
(HFL) as a biologically implemented capacity to acquire and use one or more I-
languages that associate phonological instructions to articulatory/perceptual 
systems with semantic instructions to conceptual/intentional systems, by means 
of a constrained syntax; cf. Chomsky (1995b, 2000b). Abstracting from phono-
logy, expressions of an I-language are semantic instructions.2 These expressions 
have various grammatical properties of interest to syntacticians. But whatever 
additional properties they have, expressions of an I-language (henceforth,            
i-expressions) are presumably instructions to access certain mental represen-
tations and generate others, in accord with certain principles of lexicalization and 
composition. If only for simplicity, let’s say that the representations accessed and 
generated are concepts — or more specifically, ‘i-concepts’. I assume that 
concepts are composable mental representations; see e.g. Fodor (1987, 2003, 2008). 
But this is compatible with many proposals about how i-concepts are related to 
the representations that children lexicalize and the full range of representations 
available to human thinkers.  
 If some of the representations that children lexicalize are not conceptual — 
think of mental images, maps, and prototypes — then lexicalization must 
somehow associate these pre-lexical representations with concepts. But following 
Fodor and others, I suspect that children typically lexicalize concepts, many of 
which are not uniquely human. This allows for the hypothesis that lexicalization 
is fundamentally a matter of concept labeling, and that i-concepts just are 
lexicalized concepts; cf. Bloom (2000). Alternatively, one can hypothesize that 
lexicalized concepts are linked to formally distinct i-concepts that are abstracted in 
the course of lexicalization, and that i-concepts form a special subset of the 
concepts available to humans; see section 1.4 below. But whatever the details, the 
broad idea is one that many theorists should be able to accept: Lexical items are 
instructions to fetch concepts that meet certain conditions, while phrases are 
instructions to combine fetchable concepts in certain ways.  
 From this perspective, i-expressions are concept-construction-instructions 
(Begriffsplans) that reflect principles governing combination of i-expressions and 
                                                           
    2 Likewise, abstracting from semantics, expressions of an I-language are phonological 
instructions. The point is not to privilege semantics. And even if instructions to articulatory/ 
perceptible systems appeared later, in terms of HFL’s evolutionary history, ontogeny may 
not recapitulate phylogeny in this respect. 
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‘interfaces’ between HFL and other aspects of human cognition. Correlatively, i-
concepts are concepts that can interface with HFL: i-concepts are results of 
executing instructions (i-expressions) that are generated by I-languages; and for a 
given context, an i-concept can be expressed with an i-expression whose 
execution would create the i-concept.  
 Thesis (1) is to be understood, accordingly, as a claim about i-expressions. 
 
(1) Meanings are instructions to build concepts. 
 
If i-expressions pair phonological instructions with semantic instructions, then i-
expression meanings can be described as instructions (generable via HFL) to 
fetch and/or combine i-concepts in certain ways. One can stipulate that meanings 
are not semantic instructions in this sense. But then it is hardly obvious that there 
are theories of meaning for I-languages, much less that such theories perspicu-
ously describe the natural phenomenon of human linguistic understanding. Put 
another way, one can stipulate that i-expressions pair phonological instructions 
with i-meanings and hypothesize that theories of the natural phenomenon are 
theories of i-meanings. On this view, endorsed here, understanding an i-
expression (perceiving its meaning) is a matter of recognizing that expression as a 
certain concept–construction–instruction. This proposal may be wrong. But it is 
less tendentious than it might initially appear. So let me distinguish (1) from 
some alternatives in the vicinity. 
 It is an ancient idea that lexical items label concepts, and that if a lexical 
item λ labels a concept C for a speaker S, then S can use λ to talk about whatever 
S thinks about by using C. I prefer to say that lexical items are instructions to fetch 
concepts, if only because (i) a polysemous item like book or set may be lexically 
linked to more than one fetchable concept, and (ii) as we’ll see in section 1.4, 
lexical items may fetch concepts that are formally distinct from the concepts 
initially lexicalized. Though given enough caveats, one can say that lexical i-
expressions (as used in contexts) indicate the concepts they normally fetch.  
 Some theorists prefer to say that words like rabbit and table indicate things 
like rabbits and tables, as opposed to concepts. In many cases, this is harmless. 
Predicates like unicorn and names like Vulcan present familiar worries. But one 
can maintain that words are ‘normally’ used to indicate ‘real’ things, given a 
suitably restricted notion of normal use, so long as one isn’t too demanding about 
what counts as real; cf. Chomsky (2000a), Pietroski (2005a), Hinzen (2007). In 
saying that i-expressions are Begriffsplans, my point is not to deny that speakers 
often use words to talk about language-independent things. On the contrary, my 
suggestion is that i-expressions are often used in this way because they call for 
construction of i-concepts, which are often constituents of thoughts that are 
(somehow) about mind-independent things. Since i-expressions are also associ-
ated with phonological instructions, they can be used to communicate thoughts. 
So in suitably controlled contexts, intuitions about the truth or falsity of a 
thought communicated with an i-expression can serve as useful data points for 
theories of i-meanings.3 
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 As these concessive remarks suggest, (1) is fully compatible with psycholo-
gized versions of Truth Conditional Semantics, according to which i-expressions 
are instructions to construct concepts that have Tarski-style satisfaction 
conditions.4 If semantic instructions are individuated in this externalistic fashion 
— if the instructions require construction of concepts with certain truth-theoretic 
properties — then thesis (5) is false. 
 
(5) Meanings are internalistic properties of expressions. 
 
But (1) can be combined with the hypothesis that each i-expression not only has a 
Tarskian satisfaction condition, it has that satisfaction condition essentially.  
 That said, (1) is also compatible with a claim that is more friendly to 
internalism about meaning/understanding: i-expressions are instructions to 
construct i-concepts, some of which can be refined and used (in contexts where 
truth matters) to form thoughts that count as true or false because they are 
(modulo some complications like vagueness) sufficiently like ‘Ideal Thoughts’ 
whose constituent concepts really do have Tarski-style satisfaction conditions. 
This claim, which remains agnostic about the nature of semantic instructions and 
concepts constructed, is compatible with (5). So while (1) does not presuppose 
(5), (1) may be offered as part of a package that includes (5).  
 In subsequent sections, it will be important to be clear about what (1) does 
and does not imply. So let me stress these points now. Thesis (1) is incompatible 
with ‘spare’ theories according to which i-expressions have no semantic proper-
ties other than Tarskian satisfaction conditions.5 But accepting (1), and describing 
                                                           
be characterized in terms of sets of possible worlds. When a suitably clear thought is 
asserted, we can talk about the worlds in which that thought is true; and for any suitably 
clear concept, we can talk about its extension at a world. But it does not follow that i-
expressions have intensions, much less that the meaning of an i-expression is its intension. 
One can say instead that i-expressions are used to construct concepts that have (context-
dependent) intensions; where these concepts can be combined to form thoughts whose 
contents are determined by the intensions of the constituent concepts. 
    4 See e.g. Larson & Segal (1995). This is not what Davidson (1967), Montague (1974), or Lewis 
(1972) proposed. But it is in the spirit of Harman (1970) and Partee (2004). A variant 
proposal is that i-expressions are instructions to construct concepts, and that the concepts 
constructed have satisfaction conditions, even though the instructions do not require this. 
    5 If we invent a Tarskian language in which ‘Rx1’ is satisfied by a sequence σ iff σ(1) is a 
rabbit, then ‘Rx1’ can be used to talk about rabbits, even by speakers who do not associate 
‘Rx1’ with any concept (much less a concept of rabbits as such). We might invent such a 
language, and stipulate that ‘Rx1’ has no other semantic properties, in order to guarantee 
that ‘Rx1’ has the same (concept-independent) interpretation for all users of the language. 
We can likewise stipulate that the logical constant ‘p’ is satisfied by σ iff σ(p) = Phosphorus, 
where σ(p) is the element of σ corresponding to the pth logical constant, and that ‘h’ is 
satisfied by σ iff σ(h) = Hesperus. Given the usual ancillary apparatus, it will follow that 
‘Rp’ is true iff Phosphorus is a rabbit, and that ‘Rh’ is true iff Hesperus is a rabbit. 
  In general, expressions of the invented language can have (and be understood as 
having) truth-theoretic properties as their only semantic properties. Thesis (1) implies that I-
languages do not have this spare Tarskian character. But to define a language whose 
semantics is concept-independent in this way, humans may need a prior I-language whose 
expressions are used as devices to fetch concepts that can be combined to form truth-
evaluable thoughts. 
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the meanings of i-expressions as semantic instructions, leaves room for many 
conceptions of the relevant fulfillment conditions.  
 For example, a neo-Davidsonian might regard the untensed verb phrase 
stab Caesar as the following complex instruction: Fetch a singular concept of the 
individual Caesar; fetch a concept satisfied by ordered triples <e, x, y> such that 
e is a stabbing by x of y; and saturate (the most internal variable of) the latter 
with the former, thereby forming a concept satisfied by ordered pairs <e, x> such 
that e is a stabbing by x of Caesar. On this view, the instruction stab Caesar is 
fulfilled — and in that sense, satisfied — by constructing any concept with the 
specified truth-theoretic profile. In which case, one might say that stab Caesar is 
itself satisfied by <e, x> iff e is a stabbing by x of Caesar. Likewise, one might say 
that dog is an instruction to fetch a concept satisfied by x iff x is a dog, and that 
the i-expression dog inherits this satisfaction condition. 
 There are, however, other coherent conceptions of semantic instructions 
and fulfillment. For each speaker, each lexical item might be an instruction to 
fetch a concept that has a certain ‘address’ in mental space — viz. the address of 
the concept that was lexicalized with the relevant phonological form (PF). 
Suppose that at least typically, a lexical item is acquired via some process in 
which: A PF is linked to a pre-lexical concept, perhaps initially by mere 
association, but eventually by pairing the concept with an address A such that (i) 
HFL can generate a lexical i-expression that links the PF to an instruction to fetch 
a concept paired with A, and (ii) the resulting i-expression can have certain 
additional features corresponding to grammatical idiosyncracies. If the concept 
lexicalized remains the only concept at address A, then fulfilling the instruction is 
always a matter of fetching that concept. But suppose that one or more additional 
concepts get assigned to that address. Perhaps a formally new concept is defined 
in terms of the concept lexicalized, and HFL does not assign a new address to a 
concept so formed. Or perhaps the cognitive processes underlying polysemy can 
result in a family of concepts having the same address, so far as HFL is 
concerned. In such cases, there may well be more than one way of fetching a 
concept from address A.6 
 Of course, the PF of dog could have been lexically linked to a concept of 
cats, while the PF of cat was linked to a concept of dogs. And we can imagine two 
individuals that differ only this respect: In Oscar, the PFs are linked to concepts 
in this ‘inverted’ way; while in Felix, the PFs are linked to concepts in a ‘proper-
English’ way. We can go on to say that Oscar’s I-language does not count as an 
idiolect of English. And it may well be that the normal way of acquiring an (I-
language that counts as an) idiolect of English involves using the PF of dog to 
lexicalize a concept with which the lexicalizer can think about dogs. But even if 
the concept lexicalized has a doggish satisfaction condition, it does not follow 
                                                           
    6 Suppose you tell me to fetch a box from a certain room. If I find four boxes in the room, I can 
fulfill your instruction by bringing back any one of the four. But if you also tell me to fetch a 
ball from another room, and put it in the box I fetch, then the sizes of the boxes/balls will 
impose constraints on which choices permit fulfillment of your tripartite instruction. In this 
context, see Pietroski (2005a) on the difference between France is a hexagonal republic and 
France is a hexagonal, and France is a republic; cf. Chomsky’s (1995a) discussion of London as a 
device for referring to different ‘things’ on different occasions of use. 
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that dog is an instruction to fetch a concept with that satisfaction condition, not 
even if the concept lexicalized is the concept fetched. An instruction to fetch a 
concept from a given address is not an instruction to fetch a concept with a certain 
truth-theoretic property — not even if every concept at the address has that truth-
theoretic property.7 
 This last point will be important when we turn to thesis (5). But for now, 
the point is just that thesis (1) makes it possible to reject externalist conceptions of 
meaning while accepting many externalistic claims about concepts. Readers 
already inclined to agree, or not care, can skim through to section 1.2 below.  
 Let’s grant that if a lexical item λ counts as an instance of the English word 
dog, then λ is lexically linked to a concept of dogs — i.e. a concept with which one 
can think about dogs, and think of them as such (cf. Fodor 2003). I am more 
skeptical of the following claim: λ is not an instance of the English word dog if λ is 
lexically linked to a concept that would apply to things of a kind biologically 
distinct from but superficially similar to the actual dogs. Yet even given this 
much externalism, along with the related idea that a concept of dogs needs to be 
a concept that is essentially tied to the biology of actual dogs, a lexical i-
expression can count as an instance of the English word dog without being an 
instruction to fetch a concept of dogs. For an i-expression can be an instruction to 
fetch a concept from a certain address — an address that actually links the PF of 
dog to a concept of dogs, where being a dog is a biologically demanding 
condition — without being an instruction to fetch a concept of dogs, or even an 
instruction to fetch a concept that applies to dogs. 
 In terms of the much discussed ‘twin earth’ thought experiments, doppel-
gangers might execute the same address-focused instruction — fetch a concept 
from address A — yet thereby fetch concepts with different contents, at least if 
doppelgangers in different environments can have concepts with different 
contents.8 For just as we can imagine Oscar and Felix linking different concepts to 
the PF of dog, we can imagine Felix and Twin-Felix linking different concepts to 
the PF of dog, at least if Felix and Twin-Felix do indeed have different concepts. If 
the difference between dogs and cats is salient to Oscar and Felix, they may not 
link the PF of dog to the same address in mental space; in which case, Oscar and 
Felix may not have the very same I-language, even given an address-focused 
conception of semantic instructions. But if any differences between dogs and 
twin-dogs would go undetected by Felix/Twin-Felix, then presumably, these 
duplicates are type-identical with regard to how they link the PF of dog to an 
address in mental space. If this is correct, then so far as their shared HFL is 
concerned, the PF of dog is linked to the same address. In which case, Felix and 
Twin-Felix do have the same I-language, given an address-focused conception of 
                                                           
    7 An instruction to fetch a box from a certain room differs from an instruction to fetch a red 
box, even if every box is both in that room and red. 
    8 For these purposes, we needn’t worry about the differences between Putnam’s (1975) 
scenarios — which need not correspond to possible worlds in Kripke’s (1980) sense — and 
Burge’s (1979) counterfactual situations that often hold the ‘non-linguistic environment 
fixed. Extending Kaplan’s (1988) notion of character to thought, Fodor (1987) famously 
appealed to ‘narrow’ contents; see Segal (2000) for helpful discussion. But whatever one says 
about concepts and their fulfillment conditions, the issues here concern i-expressions 
(hypothesized instructions to fetch and combine concepts). 
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semantic instructions. 
 Note that an address-focused instruction differs from any instruction to 
fetch a concept with a certain ‘narrow’ content, even if any concept fetched from 
that address indicates the same mapping from contexts to extensions. But my aim 
is not to eschew appeals to contents of any breadth. For all that I have said here, 
semantic instructions may have wide (but mind-dependent) contents that are 
individuated by the relevant addresses, or narrow contents, or both. More 
importantly, just as twins might execute the same lexical instruction, so they 
might execute the same phrasal instruction. If twins share the addresses A1 and 
A2, along with a binary operator ‘•’, each twin might fulfill the following 
instruction: Form an instance of ‘C1(_) • C2(_)’ by replacing ‘C1’ with a concept 
found at A1 and replacing ‘C2’ with a concept found at A2. If ‘•’ is a conjunction 
operator, which need not be invoked under a truth-theoretic guise, then twins 
who execute the instruction might form conjunctive concepts with different 
contents.9 
 On this view, two individuals can share an I-language and competently use 
the same lexical items to fetch concepts from the same addresses, even if (for 
whatever reason) the concepts fetched have distinct contents. My suspicion is that 
such cases are common, even without twin earth. It seems all too likely that 
speakers in the same conversation often share an i-expression (e.g. water), while 
severally using the expression to fetch concepts that differ extensionally in ways 
that are often but not always irrelevant — at least if we suppose that the concepts 
fetched via lexical items really do have extensions in contexts. Given two 
concepts that apply to the stuff in Lake Michigan, only one may apply to the stuff 
coming out of a certain tap; cf. Chomsky (2000a).  
 More generally, one shouldn’t insist that if two otherwise linguistically 
similar speakers each use a lexical item to fetch concept, a mere extensional 
difference in the concepts fetched guarantees that either (i) the lexical instructions 
differ, or (ii) each instruction is associated with the same function from contexts to 
extensions, given a substantive notion of context — e.g., a sequence of potential 
values for conceptual variables, as opposed to entire possible worlds or their 
‘extension-determining’ aspects. Another option, considered but not developed 
by Putnam (1975), is to deny that meanings determine extensions in contexts. 
 The meaning of an i-expression may determine the general ‘shape’ of any 
concept constructed in accord with that semantic instruction, without 
determining a characteristic function (from contexts to contents) for any concept 
so constructed. One can invent a Begriffsschrift that employs lots of indices, and 
thereby confines the content variation in concepts constructed to values of 
variables; cf. Stanley (2000). But I-languages may care less about conceptual 
content. One can say, if one likes, that Twin-Felix fails to have an I-language that 
                                                           
    9 This assumes that twin-concepts can have the same address, and hence that addresses can 
be individuated without reference to the satisfiers of addressed concepts. But if this is a 
substantive assumption, so is its negation. One can still say that each twin executes a 
demonstrative instruction, akin to “Fetch one of those,” with a distinctive ‘wide’ fulfillment 
condition (if each twin has his own concepts). My claim is not that it is incorrect to describe 
twin-earth cases externalistically, but rather, that theorists can — and perhaps should — 
describe such cases internalistically.  
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counts as an idiolect of English (and that his I-language fails to employ an 
English ‘water’-address), while Felix fails to have an I-language that counts as an 
idiolect of Twinglish. But there may be no theoretically interesting distinction 
between an I-language that counts as an idiolect of English and an I-language 
that counts as idiolects of Twinglish. If the difference is simply a matter of which 
environment the implemented procedure inhabits, then for scientific purposes, 
there may be no difference English procedures and Twinglish procedures. 
 There certainly are substantive issues about concepts, and their relation to 
normative notions like truth, in the vicinity; see Burge (2005). And with or 
without such issues in mind, one can hypothesize that duplicates can have 
different I-languages, taking the relevant procedures (intensions) to be 
individuated externalistically. Chomsky (1986) did not stipulate that I-languages 
are individuated internalistically; his was a proposal about how to count natural 
languages for scientific purposes. In any case, Ludlow (forthcoming) offers a 
notion of ‘Ψ-language’ that is neutral in this respect, while preserving the idea 
that Ψ-languages are like I-languages in being psychologically implemented 
algorithms — as opposed to E-languages, which are sets (extensions) of 
expressions. Externalists can thus eschew appeal to E-languages, yet allow for 
duplicates who implement different Ψ-languages. 
 If the only constraints on semantic instructions are truth-theoretic, then 
many distinctions will be irrelevant to fulfillment. If the i-expression groundhogs 
who like coriander is satisfied by construction of any concept with the right truth-
theoretic properties, and similarly for woodchucks fond of cilantro, then individuals 
who implement very different psychological processes may fulfill the same 
instruction. But one can individuate instructions finely — saying both that truth-
theoretically identical phrases can be semantically distinct (internal constraints 
matter), and that twins can execute distinct instructions (external constraints 
matter). One cannot, however, stipulate that meanings are instructions, so 
individuated. For one cannot stipulate the nature of i-expressions.10 
 One can stipulate that instructions are semantic only if they are truth-
theoretic. But then internalists can say that i-expressions are psemantic 
instructions, with silent ‘p’ for ‘psycho’ (cf. Katz & Fodor 1963), leaving it open 
whether or not psemantic instructions are individuated truth-theoretically. 
Expressions of an I-language may be meaningful, in the sense of being psemantic 
instructions, without being semantic instructions in the stipulated sense. If it is 
also stipulated that expressions are meaningful only if they are semantic 
instructions, one can regard it is an open question whether i-expressions are 
meaningful in this doubly stipulated sense. The substantive debates concern the 
nature of the instructions. And to repeat, thesis (1) 
 
(1) Meanings are instructions to build concepts. 
 
                                                           
    10 One can introduce a technical notion of ‘Meaning’ according to which Meanings determine 
extensions, and describe a purpose P such that the following normative claim is plausible: 
other things equal, expressions of a language used for purpose P ought to have Meanings. 
But that is a very different project. 
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provides a relatively neutral way of framing these debates. But (1) can be 
combined with independently confirmable theses that are, when taken together, 
less neutral. 
 
1.2. Concatenation Calls for Conjunction of Monadic Concepts 
 
At the heart of compositional semantics lies a simple question: What is the 
significance of combining expressions? For invented languages, answers can be 
stipulated. But for I-languages (cf. Higginbotham [1985]), the questions are 
empirical: What is the significance of combining i-expressions? Or put another 
way, taking i-expressions to be Begriffsplans, what operations of concept 
combination do complex i-expressions invoke? 
 Any proposal has immediate consequences for the significance of 
combinable expressions, since combinables must be of the right types for 
purposes of combination. In part because of the justified influence of Frege (1879, 
1892) and Montague (1974) — despite their own non-psychologistic (though not 
anti-psychological) projects — it became standard to assume that combination 
signifies function-application. In which case, for any pair of combined 
expressions, one must signify an element in the domain of the function signified 
by the other. This made appeals to type-shifting unavoidable, given that I-
languages allow for complex predicates like red ball, along with simple predicates 
like red and ball. On this view, combination always signifies function-application, 
but with the caveat that combination may also signify a further operation of type 
adjustment for adjuncts. Put another way, the familiar idea was that while 
concatenation is a univocal instruction to apply a function to an argument, com-
bination may have significance that goes beyond that of mere concatenation of 
expressions. 
 More recently, the trend has been towards views according to which some 
but not all cases of combination signify function-application (or equivalently, 
predicate-saturation), even within the tradition of transformational grammar.11 
Elsewhere, I have argued for a stronger hypothesis: Combination always signifies 
predicate-conjunction, but with the caveat that combination may also signify a 
further operation of type adjustment for arguments. In my view, while concate-
nation is a univocal instruction to conjoin monadic concepts, combination may 
have significance that goes beyond that of mere concatenation.  
 To clarify, it may help to consider some proposals about expression 
formation. We can characterize an operation COMBINE, such that if α and β are 
combinable expressions of an I-language, then COMBINE(α, β) is the result of 
combining them. This operation is somehow asymmetric, since phrases are 
headed; for example, combining a verb with a noun yields a verb phrase, not a 
mere verb–noun concatenation. But the operation COMBINE(α, β), so character-
ized, may or may not be primitive. It might be basic, like Chomsky’s (1995b, 
                                                           
    11 See e.g. Higginbotham (1985), Larson & Segal (1995), and Heim & Kratzer (1998) — and in 
the tradition of categorial grammar, Steedman (2000). Of course, Davidson (1967b) had 
proposed logical forms involving both saturation and conjunction, at least for certain adver-
bially modified verb phrases. 
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2000b) operation MERGE(α, β). And there are several ways of being non-basic. 
The operation COMBINE(α, β) might turn out to be a disjunction of basic 
operations — e.g., ADJOIN(α, β) or SELECT(α, β) — reflecting two or more 
asymmetric ways of forming phrases. But another possibility is that while 
phrases are always formed in the same way, COMBINE(α, β) is a complex 
operation. In particular, phrase formation may be a process of concatenating 
expressions and labeling the result; see Hornstein (in press) and Hornstein & 
Pietroski (2008a, 2008b). So one can adopt the hypothesis below, 
 
 COMBINE(α, β) = LABEL[CONCATENATE(α, β)] 
 CONCATENATE(α, β) = α^β 
 LABEL[α^β] = [α β]α/β 
 
with CONCATENATE(α, β) and LABEL[α^β] as the posited basic operations 
invoked by I-languages.  
 The subscript on [α β]α/β indicates that one of the concatenates is itself the 
label of the structured object, which can be identified with an ordered pair like 
{{α, β}, α}; cf. Chomsky (1995b). The source of phrasal asymmetry is then 
confined to the labeling operation, whose inputs are symmetric concatenations. 
Given any such view, one can go on to say that concatenation is an instruction to 
perform a certain binary operation on concepts, and that labeling is an instruction 
to perform some further operation on the concept associated with the non-
dominant concatenate. Let me first illustrate this point from a traditional 
perspective, according to which concatenation signifies saturation, before turning 
to the idea that concatenation signifies conjunction. 
 One can hypothesize that the phrase [red ball]ball is the following 
instruction: Fetch a concept linked to ball, say BALL(_), with ‘_’ as a variable 
ranging over individuals; fetch a concept linked to red, say RED(_), and perform a 
‘lifting’ operation to obtain the corresponding concept λX.X(X) & RED(_); then 
saturate one of these concepts with the other, thereby obtaining a concept like 
BALL(_) & RED(_). One can describe the lifting operation as a reflex of the labeling: 
The label on [red ball]ball serves as an instruction to type-adjust the concept 
fetched via the other constituent; cf. Parsons (1970) and Kamp (1975). On this 
view, only some labels trigger this reflex. For the leading idea is that a phrase like 
[stab Caesar]stab, in which a verb takes an argument, is an instruction to fetch 
concepts linked to the lexical constituents and then simply saturate one concept 
with the other (without any type-shifting). But asymmetry in the semantic effects 
of labeling is easily encoded.  
 Suppose that phrasal instructions are issued by pairs of expressions that 
have been concatenated and labeled as a unit, as opposed to the two concatenates 
taken separately. Think of [α β]α as a complex instruction that includes two sub-
instructions that correspond to label-relativized concatenates: β relative to the label 
α, and α relative to the label α; where one of these sub-instructions is simply α 
relative to itself. If phrasal instructions are issued by labeled concatenations, and 
CONCAT is the operation signified by concatenation, then one can say that the 
phrasal expression [α β]α is an instruction to apply CONCAT to the concepts 
obtained by executing two sub-instructions: β relative to α, and α relative to α; 
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where relativizing an expression/instruction to itself makes no semantic 
difference.12 The idea, which is independent of any particular hypothesis about 
CONCAT, is that the non-dominant concatenate β may need to be adjusted for 
purposes of combining with α. The kind of adjustment called for, if any, will 
depend on CONCAT and β. But one can hypothesize that CONCAT is the oper-
ation of saturation, and that predicate–adjunct combination (unlike predicate–
argument combination) invokes type-lifting. For one can say that combining a 
predicate with a grammatical argument makes no difference to the instruction 
associated with the argument, while combining a predicate with an adjunct is an 
instruction to type-lift the adjunctive instruction.  
 If only for simplicity, let’s assume that one way or another Caesar is marked 
as an argument, while stab, ball, and red are marked as predicates. And for ease of 
notation, let’s underline arguments. (From a traditional perspective, one might 
think of underlining as an instruction to ignore phrasal relativization, thus pre-
cluding any substantive ‘shifting’ of the constituent semantic instruction.) Then 
the phrase [stab Caesar]stab can be an instruction to perform saturation on con-
cepts obtained by executing two vacuously relativized expressions/instructions: 
stab relative to stab, and Caesar relative to stab. That is, despite the phrasal label, 
[stab Caesar]stab can be an instruction to perform saturation on concepts obtained 
by simply executing stab and Caesar. By contrast, [red ball]ball can be an instruc-
tion to perform saturation on concepts obtained by executing two relativized 
expressions/instructions, one of which is non-vacuously relativized: red relative 
to ball, and ball relative to ball. That is, given the phrasal label, [red ball]ball can be 
an instruction to perform saturation on (i) a concept obtained by executing red 
and type-lifting, and (ii) a concept obtained by simply executing ball. 
 Alternatively, one can invert the traditional perspective and adopt the fol-
lowing hypothesis: CONCAT is an operation of conjunction — more specifically, 
conjunction of monadic concepts; and predicate-argument combination, unlike 
predicate-adjunct combination, invokes a kind of type-adjustment. I discuss my 
specific neo-Davidsonian proposal, in terms of thematic roles, in section 1.3 
below. But if combining a predicate with an adjunct makes no difference to the 
instruction associated with the adjunct, then [red ball]ball can be an instruction to 
conjoin two monadic concepts, obtained by executing two vacuously relativized 
instructions: red relative to ball, and ball relative to ball. That is, despite the 
phrasal label, [red ball]ball can be an instruction to conjoin concepts obtained by 
simply executing red and ball. And we can say that combining a predicate α with 
a grammatical argument β is an instruction to type-adjust the instruction issue by 
β itself. For given the phrasal label, [stab Caesar]stab can be an instruction to 
conjoin a pair of monadic concepts obtained by executing two relativized 
expressions/instructions, one of which is non-vacuously relativized: stab relative 
to stab, and Caesar relative to stab. That is, [stab Caesar]stab can be an instruction to 
conjoin concepts obtained by (i) simply executing stab, and (ii) executing Caesar 
and type-adjusting.  
                                                           
    12 This is a restricted version of the relativization that Higginbotham (1986) employs. For these 
purposes, I treat ballN and stabV as primitives. But see Hornstein & Pietroski (forthcoming) 
for more detailed discussion, and some implications of treating labels as formatives that can 
be combined with unlabeled lexical roots. 
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 If it helps, think of underlining on this nontraditional view as an 
instruction to relativize non-vacuously: The ‘default’ effect of label-relativization 
is null, with a restricted kind of (thematic) relativization as the marked case. I 
cannot here defend this proposal in any detail. But in I-languages, adjunction 
seems to be open-ended (especially given relative clauses), while predicates seem 
to combine with at most three grammatical arguments.13 Prima facie, this casts 
doubt on the semantic tradition of treating adjuncts as the marked cases that call 
for special treatment. And if adjunction invokes monadic concept conjunction, as 
a (biologically implemented) recursive combination operation, one might wonder 
if I-languages also invoke a recursive operation of saturation in which a concept 
of adicity n combines with a semantic argument to yield a concept of adicity n–1. 
But the more important point here is that we can (at least conceptually) decom-
pose the semantic effect of combining expressions into the semantic effects of 
concatenating and labeling. And since labeling need not be semantically vacuous, 
one can distinguish the semantic effect of combining expressions from the 
semantic effect of concatenating expressions — even if in some cases, this 
distinction is not semantically significant. 
 In short, each expression of the form [α β]α can be a ‘macro’ instruction: 
execute the sub-instructions α and β, obtaining concepts C1 and C2, respectively; 
then form the concept CONCAT(C1, LAB[C2, α]), where LAB[C2, α] is the 
concept formed by subjecting C2 to the (perhaps vacuous) operation induced by 
the label α. Again, this general idea is compatible with various proposals about 
which operations CONCAT and LAB are. But suppose CONCAT is an operation 
of monadic concept conjunction, signified with ‘•’. Then [α β]α is an instruction to 
build a monadic concept of the following form: C1(_) • LAB[C2(_), α]; where 
LAB[C2(_), α] may be a complex thematic concept of the form ∃X[C(X) • Θ(_, X)]. 
Potential values of the variable ‘_’ include events, which can have individual 
participants, and individuals (which can be event participants). So concatenation 
can be an instruction to conjoin monadic concepts — and in this sense, 
conjunction can be the basic I-language mode of semantic combination — 
without each expression of the form [α β]α being an instruction to conjoin 
concepts formed by executing the sub-instructions α and β. 
 Strictly speaking, ‘•’ is a little more permissive than an operator that can be 
flanked only by monadic concepts. The idea is that (the conceptual operation 
indicated with) ‘•’ can be used to combine a monadic concept C(X) with a 
formally dyadic concept Θ(_, X) — with ‘X’ ranging over potential participants of 
values of ‘_’ — so long as one variable in the resulting concept, C(X) • Θ(_, X), is 
immediately closed to create a formally monadic concept. But one can 
hypothesize that this slightly relaxed operation of monadic concept conjunction is 
the one invoked by I-languages.14 
                                                           
    13 In this context, see Pietroski (2005a) for an argument that that-clauses are semantically like 
adjuncts, and a review of the trend towards (i) analyzing ditransitive constructions in terms 
of a covert preposition (suggesting a maximum of two arguments) and (ii) analyzing many 
transitive constructions in terms of a covert light verb. 
    14 Here, I am also ignoring the difference between verbish instructions (which tend to be 
tensable) and nounish instructions (which tend to be indexable); see Hornstein & Pietroski 
(forthcoming) for discussion drawing on Baker (2005). 
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1.3. Grammatical Relations Invoke Thematic Relations and ∃-Closure 
 
For present purposes, I take it as given that in I-languages, predicate-argument 
relations are at least often associated with thematic relations. Correspondingly, I 
assume, it is not ad hoc to say that an argument like Caesar in stab Caesar is some-
how associated with a thematic concept like PATIENT(_, CAESAR); where this 
complex monadic concept applies to ‘events’ that have Caesar as their patient. If 
we can seriously entertain the more traditional idea that [red ball]ball is an 
instruction to form a concept like λX.X(_) & RED(_), which gets saturated with a 
concept like BALL(_), then we can seriously entertain a structurally similar idea: 
[stab Caesar]stab is an instruction to form a concept like PATIENT(_, CAESAR) and 
conjoin it with another monadic concept of events like STAB(_); likewise,     
[Brutus [stab Caesar]stab]stab is an instruction to add a conjunct like              
AGENT(_, BRUTUS). 
 I also assume that I-languages invoke a cognitive operation that is like 
existential closure in two respects. First, when the operation is applied to a 
monadic concept C(_), it yields a complete thought of the form ∃_[C(_)]; where a 
thought of this form is correct iff C(_) applies to one or more things. More briefly, 
the operation converts C(_) into a thought that is true iff C(_) is not empty. 
Second, the operation can convert a formally dyadic concept of the form         
‘C(X) • Θ(_, X)’ — with values ‘X’ being potential participants of values of ‘_’ — 
into a monadic concept of form ‘∃X[C(X) • Θ(_, X)]’; where a concept of this form 
applies to one or more potential values of ‘_’ iff they are related, in the right 
thematic way, to one or more things that fall under the relevant monadic concept. 
But I do not assume that the closure operation invoked by I-languages, signified 
here with ‘∃’, has the full power of existential closure to convert any concept of 
adicity n into a concept of adicity n-1 by binding any conceptual variable. For 
example, I do not assume that this operation can convert a tetradic concept of the 
form ‘R(X, Y) & S(W, X, Z) ⊃ T(Y, Z, W)]’ into a triadic concept of the form      
‘∃X[R(X, Y) & S(W, X, Z) ⊃ T(Y, Z, W)]’. Correlatively, the cognitive effect of the 
posited closure operation need not be characterized (à la Tarski) in terms of the 
satisfaction conditions imposed by open sentences with arbitrarily many 
variables on sequences of arbitrary many potential values of variables. 
 In Pietroski (2005b, 2006, 2008a, 2008b), I show how these relatively modest 
resources can provide a compositional semantics that accommodates a wide 
range of constructions — including causative and ditransitive constructions, 
plural noun phrases, prepositions, negation, and quantificational determiners 
like every that take tensed clauses as their external arguments. This is not the 
place for an explicit fragment of a semantic theory. But to illustrate, suppose that 
internal and external arguments of predicates are relativized as such. 
 For any grammatical argument ..., let int-... be the instruction issued by ... 
when it appears as the internal argument of a predicate, and let ext-... be the 
instruction issued by ... when it appears as the external argument of a predicate. 
(If each predicate takes at most two grammatical arguments, ‘ext’ can be replaced 
with ‘~int’, treating each external argument as the non-internal argument of its 
predicate.) And suppose that each argument is, by itself, an instruction to form a 
monadic concept. This concept may be complex and context sensitive, reflecting a 
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complex expression that includes a lexical noun along with a covert determiner 
and/or index. But for now, we can idealize, taking the relevant concepts to be 
atomic: CAESARIZER(_) and BRUTUSIZER(_); cf. Quine (1963), though see section 1.4 
below. If grammatical arguments are instructions to build monadic concepts, it is 
easy to provide composition principles according to which the relativized 
expressions ‘int-Caesar‘ and ‘ext-Brutus‘ are instructions to build concepts of 
things with internal/external participants: ∃X[CAESARIZER(X) • INTERNAL(_, X)], 
∃X[BRUTUSIZER(X) • EXTERNAL(_, X)]; where in each case, the variable introduced 
by the proper noun is ∃-closed. 
 Thus, [Brutus [stab Caesar]stab]stab can be an instruction to construct a 
concept like the following: ∃X[BRUTUSIZER(X) • EXTERNAL(_, X)] • [STAB(_) • 
∃X[CAESARIZER(X) • INTERNAL(_, X)]]. And if stab is understood as an instruction 
to fetch a concept of things (actions) whose internal/external arguments are the 
patients/agents of those things, the formalistic notions INTERNAL(_, X) and 
EXTERNAL(_, X) can be replaced with more specific thematic contents: 
∃X[BRUTUSIZER(X) • AGENT(_, X)] • [STAB(_) • ∃X[CAESARIZER(X) • PATIENT(_, X)]].15 
 Adding tense and a final existential closure can yield a complete thought, 
corresponding to Brutus stabbed Caesar: ∃_[PAST(_) • [∃X[BRUTUSIZER(X) • 
AGENT(_, X)] • [STAB(_) • ∃X[CAESARIZER(X) • PATIENT(_, X)]]]]. Alternatively, the 
untensed clause can itself be the internal argument of a larger verb phrase as in 
see Brutus stab Caesar, as shown: 
 
 SEE(_) • ∃X[INTERNAL(_, X) • [∃X'[BRUTUSIZER(X') & AGENT(X, X')] • 
 [STAB(X) • ∃X[CAESARIZER(X') • PATIENT(X, X')]]]]  
 
And this construction can be treated on a par with see a tree: 
 
 SEE(_) • ∃X[INTERNAL(_, X) • TREE(X)] 
 
 Of course, one wants to see the details for other construction types. But for 
present purposes, I take it as premise that the requisite homework can be done, 
along the lines suggested in Pietroski (2005b, 2006, 2008a, 2008b): The 
Conjunctivist idea outlined in section 1.2 can be turned into detailed theory, by 
hypothesizing that (i) certain grammatical relations serve as instructions to 
introduce certain dyadic/thematic relations, and (ii) each cycle or ‘phase’ directs 
construction of a conjunctive concept whose main variable, introduced by the 
syntactic head, can be ∃-closed; where this may leave open exactly one 
thematically introduced variable, thereby allowing for subsequent conjunction 
with other monadic concepts. A more radical suggestion, not explored here, is 
that the requisite ∃-closures reflect interface conditions between HFL — which 
always generates instructions to construct monadic concepts, as opposed to 
complete sentences of type <t> — and cognitive systems whose representations 
have correctness conditions along with at least some dyadic/thematic constituents. 
 
                                                           
    15 One can add that the internal/external participants of stabs are their agents/patients: 
∀E[STAB(E) ⊃ ∀x[AGENT(E, X) ≡ EXTERNAL(E, X)] & ∀X[PATIENT(E, X) ≡ INTERNAL(E, X)]]. 
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1.4. Lexicalization is a Partly Creative Process of Abstraction 
 
I have been assuming that lexical items can be instructions to fetch monadic 
concepts, even with regard to words like Brutus and stab, which were presumably 
introduced in the course of lexicalizing non-monadic concepts like BRUTUS and 
STAB(X, Y) — or STAB(X, Y, Z), with ‘z’ as a variable for instruments, or STAB(X, Y, E), 
or STAB(X, Y, Z, E). I readily grant that humans and other animals have singular 
and polyadic concepts, and that such concepts are often lexicalized. But the 
concept lexicalized with an i-expression need not be the concept subsequently 
fetched with that expression. For lexicalization can be a process in which non-
monadic concepts are paired with monadic analogs, even if the monadic analogs 
have to be abstracted from the concepts lexicalized. 
 Imagining mechanisms for such abstraction is not difficult. For illustration, 
suppose the concept lexicalized with stab is dyadic, with no event variable. Given 
STAB(X, Y), and enough logical apparatus to define new concepts, lexicalizers 
might be able to introduce a triadic concept STAB(_, X, Y): ∀X∀Y{STAB(X, Y) ≡ 
∃_[STAB(_, X, Y)]}; cf. Davidson (1967b). Then STAB(_) might be introduced via 
thematic notions: ∀X∀Y∀_{STAB(_, X, Y) ≡ AGENT(_, X) & STAB(_) & PATIENT(_, X)}; 
cf. Castañeda (1967) and Davidson (1985). Then stab can be an instruction to fetch 
STAB(_), with thematic notions introduced via grammatical arguments and/or 
prepositional phrases, which may be lexically mandatory or optional; see 
Pietroski (2008a, 2008b) for further details. 
 This kind of abstraction may require (non-recursive) cognitive resources 
that are not needed for Conjunctivist composition of i-concepts. But lexicalization 
is one thing, composition another. Or perhaps lexicalizers can use STAB(X, Y) to 
introduce STAB(_) more directly and in more restricted terms: 
 
 ∃X∃Y[STAB(X, Y)] ≡ ∃_{∃X[AGENT(_, X)] • [STAB(_) • ∃X[PATIENT(_, X)]]} 
 
But whatever the details, the idea is that children can abstract a monadic concept 
of stabs from the presumably polyadic concept lexicalized with stab. And given 
an independent grip on the relevant thematic notions, one can allow for 
patientless (and/or agentless) stabs, at least as conceptual possibilities; cf. 
Parsons (1990). For even if each actual stab is a stabbing of something by 
someone, there may be no contradiction in the thought that some stab that lacks a 
patient also lacks an agent. 
 In general, a lexicalizable n-adic concept can be used to define a monadic 
analog, given n thematic relations. And there are various ways of reanalyzing 
singular concepts as monadic, even without appealing to predicates like 
Brutusizer, which apply to at most one thing. Suppose the name Brutus is intro-
duced in the course of lexicalizing an atomic singular concept. Even if the pre-
lexical concept is a simple ‘mental tag’ of type <e>, the name can be a complex 
expression used to fetch and combine two concepts — one demonstrative, and 
one metalinguistic (cf. Burge 1973 or Katz 1994). In many languages, proper 
nouns can and often must appear with an overt determiner or demonstrative, as 
in the/that/our Brutus, suggesting that the proper noun is (used to fetch a concept 
that is) of type <e, t>; see Longobardi (1994), Giannakidou & Stavrou (1999). If 
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names in English are structurally similar, with a covert functional element, the 
lexical proper noun Brutus can be analyzed as an instruction to fetch a concept of 
things called (with the sound of) Brutus. Independent evidence in favor of some 
such analysis is independent evidence that singular concepts are indeed paired 
with monadic analogs in the course of lexicalization; see Pietroski (2007), 
drawing on many others, for further discussion. But let me summarize, to this 
point, by returning to a more theoretically neutral idea. 
 Whatever one says about the significance of the COMBINE(α, β), expres-
sions formed via this grammatical operation can be viewed as instructions to 
construct concepts of certain types. Unless one thinks that grammatical 
combination is effectively unrestricted, there will be many possible conceptual 
types such that i-expressions are never instructions to construct concepts of those 
types. On the assumption that COMBINE(α, β) signifies at most a few operations, 
and that lexical types are subject to nontrivial constraints of some kind, there will 
be some range of types such that each i-expression is an instruction to construct a 
concept of one of those types. All i-concepts will belong to this class of concepts.  
 Conjunctivism is a very restrictive thesis according to which all i-concepts 
are monadic. Theorists are free to adopt more permissive semantic theories, 
according to which i-concepts exhibit many types: <e>, <t>, <e, t >, <e, <e, t>>; 
<t, t>, <t, <t, t>>; <<e, t>, t>, <<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>>; <<e, t>, <e, t>>, and perhaps 
others. But I know of no good reason for positing i-concepts of type <<t, e>, e>, 
and likewise for endlessly many other possible concepts definable in terms of 
<e> and <t>. Ideally, one wants a characterization of the possible types for i-
concepts that is empirically adequate without overgenerating. In this respect, 
Conjunctivists try to err on the side of positing too little: The idea is to start by 
supposing that all i-concepts are type <e, t>, and then find out which facts 
can/cannot be accommodated in this fashion.16 But whatever one says about the 
space of i-concepts, the concepts fetched via lexical items have to be in this space, 
since COMBINE(α, β) only operates on combinable expressions that are used to 
fetch or construct i-concepts. 
 By contrast, there is no requirement that all concepts be i-concepts. 
Humans and other animals may have concepts that cannot be combined via the 
operation(s) signified via COMBINE(α, β). For example, concepts are often satu-
rated. But it does not follow that some i-concepts saturate others. And on any 
view, some of the concepts that a child lexicalizes may fail to be of the right form 
for purposes of I-language combination. In which case, some and perhaps many 
pre-lexical concepts will have to paired with i-concept analogs that can be fetched 
via the resulting words. 
                                                           
    16 If all i-concepts are number neutral (see Schein 1993, 2002, 2006 and Pietroski 2005b, 2008a, 
2008b), perhaps we should say that i-concepts are uniformly of type <_, t>; where judg-
ments are of type <t>, and a concept is of type <_, t> if it applies to one-or-more things, 
allowing for concepts that are neither essentially singular (in that they apply to two or more 
things only distributively) nor essentially plural (in that only apply, and only apply non-
distributively, to two or more things). In which case, it may be that no pre-lexical concepts 
are i-concepts. For it may be that all pre-lexical concepts are either essentially singular or 
essentially plural. But let’s set this complication aside. 
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  Imposing an I-language on pre-lexical thought may thus require some 
conceptual ‘reformatting’. Frege (1879, 1884, 1892) envisioned a process of 
imposing a Begriffsschrift on pre-scientific thought, recognizing that this would 
require considerable reformatting of our natural ideas. By inventing modern 
logic, and offering some ‘fruitful definitions’ of key arithmetic notions, Frege 
provided a model of how such reformatting might proceed — at least in principle 
— for the special case of imposing a now familiar hierarchy of types, which 
correspond to concepts that can be combined via function-application. (See Horty 
(2007) for extended discussion.) Frege was not offering hypotheses about HFL; he 
was concerned with an idealized language of scientific thought, designed to 
reflect the mind-independent world, not the I-languages that children so readily 
acquire. But one can use the basic types <e> and <t> to define a space of ‘F-
concepts’, and then characterize sub-regions of this space in terms of constraints 
corresponding to possible operations for combining F-concepts.  
 Frege’s operation of saturation imposes no constraint; for any F-concept, 
there is another such that they can be combined via saturation. But other 
operations, like monadic concept conjunction, only permit certain combinations 
of F-concepts. More generally, given one or more composition operations, let’s 
say that an F-concept of type <α> is licensed iff for some type <β>, an F-concept of 
type <α> can be combined with an F-concept of type <β> given the operation(s). 
Correlatively, given one or more composition operations, we can at least imagine 
minds that go through a critical period in which many mental representations 
that are not licensed by those operations get used to abstract formally distinct but 
analytically related concepts that are licensed by those operations. One can 
hypothesize that human children go through some such critical period, because 
they have a language faculty, and that we humans thereby acquire a Fregean 
‘second nature’ in the following sense: We acquire certain i-concepts, and thereby 
acquire some F-concepts we did not already have; where these formally new 
concepts can be combined via operations invoked by I-languages. Conjunctivists 
adopt the view that all i-concepts are monadic. In which case, the combination 
operations can be rather restrictive, but lexicalization needs to be a little creative, 
in ways that dovetail with the special role that certain dyadic/thematic concepts 
play in allowing I-languages to interface with pre-lexical thought. 
 
1.5. Meanings are Internalistic Properties of Expressions 
 
As already noted, one can say that meanings are instructions to create i-concepts, 
while maintaining that the semantic properties of expressions are individuated 
externalistically. Likewise, Conjunctivism is logically compatible with truth 
conditional semantics. One can say that theories of meaning for I-languages will 
take the form of Tarski-style theories of truth, with concatenation signifying 
conjunction. But truth conditional semantics faces considerable difficulties, even 
if one ignores biologically imposed constraints on composition. And in my view, 
it is especially implausible that i-expressions have Tarskian satisfaction 
conditions that compose in the fashion sketched above. In short, (1)–(4) may 
together make (5) plausible. 
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(1) Meanings are instructions to build concepts. 
(2) Concatenation signifies predicate-conjunction. 
(3) Grammatical relations invoke thematic relations and ∃-closure. 
(4) Lexicalization is a partly creative process of abstraction. 
(5) Meanings are internalistic properties of expressions.  
 
 For if Conjunctivism is even roughly correct, it seems that the nature of 
semantic composition is determined by relatively simple computations, which 
permit construction of representations with formal properties that make them 
suited for ‘interfacing’ between HFL (the human faculty of language) and other 
aspects of human cognition. It would be amazing — in ways suggesting cosmic 
benevolence — if these simple computations also let us generate representations 
that reflect the language-independent world well enough to have compositional-
ly determined satisfaction conditions. Frege and Tarski showed us, among other 
things, just how hard it is to design a language that has a truth-theoretic seman-
tics, even when one can stipulate the operative composition principles. Especially 
given the much discussed paradoxes — involving, for example, self-reference 
and vagueness — a plausible externalism about truth may impose limits on the 
kinds of languages for which a truth-theoretic semantics can be given. One 
cannot just declare that an expression like set of bald linguists who often use hetero-
logical words has a compositionally determined satisfaction condition. But even 
setting such considerations aside, constraints on I-languages seem to be at best 
orthogonal to the requirements of compositional truth theories, and often at odds 
with the idea that there are Conjunctivist truth theories for I-languages.  
 To take a much discussed example, consider The sky is blue, which seems to 
be on a grammatical par with The pie is round. Prima facie, a truth conditional 
semantics will need to treat sky as a predicate satisfied by skies, one of which can 
be (in a context c) the relevant thing x such that the truth or falsity of the sentence 
(relative to c) depends on whether or not x is blue (in c). For now, set aside 
worries about what contexts need to be, and what it is be blue (in a context). 
What is x supposed to be? Tarski could stipulate that the satisfiers of a given pre-
dicate were, for example, natural numbers; where these abstracta were ante-
cedently well defined. Correspondingly, the right hand sides of metalinguistic 
claims like ‘Pb is true iff 2 is prime’ are couched in a theoretical idiom that is 
antecedently understood in terms of an explicit model of certain aspects of 
reality. Given certain notational conventions, the number two can be identified 
with a certain set; and we know, in a scientific way, what it is for a number to 
prime. But what are skies, and what is it to identify one of them as the one said to 
be blue? Absent answers to these questions, it is hard to even begin evaluating 
the hypothesis that an i-expression like The sky is blue has a compositionally 
determined truth condition.  
 I don’t deny that we humans have one or more sky-concepts, along with 
various color-concepts. On the contrary, I think speakers can and do access such 
concepts in response to semantic instructions like The sky is blue. But even if one 
speculates that these concepts have satisfaction conditions, one need not burden 
semantic theorizing with the further speculation that i-expressions inherit these 
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satisfaction conditions. Recalling section 1.1, in any given I-language, the word 
sky may be an instruction to fetch a concept from a certain lexical address — as 
opposed to an instruction to fetch a concept with a certain satisfaction condition. 
If a child acquires an I-language that counts as an idiolect of English, then 
presumably, the child uses lexical i-expressions to fetch concepts that have been 
paired with phonological forms in ways that respect substantive constraints. But 
it doesn’t follow that the child’s i-expressions are (or that the child somehow 
takes her i-expressions to be) instructions to fetch concepts that meet these 
constraints. The instructions may be address-focused, even if more demanding 
conditions are met, de facto. 
 To be sure, theorists can inscribe ‘axioms’ and ‘theorems’ like the following: 
x satisfies Brutus iff x is a sky; x satisfies blue iff x is blue; x satisfies blue sky iff x is 
a sky and x is blue; etc. But absent a specific proposal about the potential values 
of the variable, this seems like an overly technical (and therefore misleading) way 
of saying that blue and Brutus are devices for fetching monadic concepts, and that 
blue sky is an instruction to conjoin concepts fetched via blue and Brutus. Of 
course, any one example is just that. But especially if concatenation uniformly 
signifies a simple operation like conjunction, truth conditional semanticists will 
continually face uncomfortable questions about values of the relevant variables. 
 One can be lulled into thinking that at least event variables are friendly to 
truth conditional semantics, since there are indeed events. But as Davidson (1985) 
himself noted, difficult questions of event individuation arise as soon as one 
takes such variables seriously in the context of a truth theory. (Are events 
individuated in terms of their spatiotemporal location, their causes/effects, their 
participants, or still other factors? Under what conditions are counterfactual 
claims about an event true?) And if we take events to be the values of event 
variables in theories of meaning for I-languages, without stipulating that these 
variable-values are also language-independent spatiotemporal particulars, then 
appealing to thematic relations quickly leads to the conclusion that events are 
distinguished in ways that reflect grammatical distinctions; see e.g. Schein (1993, 
2002) and Tenny (1995). For example, no event of you facing me can be identical 
with an event of me facing you: Otherwise, a facing whose agent is you would be 
a facing whose agent is me; in which case, you’d be me. Or suppose there was an 
event of Jim Higginbotham drinking a (pint of) beer in a minute. It seems that 
qua value of an event variable, any such event must be distinct from any 
simultaneous event of Jim drinking beer for a minute, at least if in a minute and 
for a minute are truth-theoretic conjuncts of the relevant event descriptions. For if 
there is just one event of drinking that satisfies both conjuncts, then prima facie,   
Jim drank beer in a minute should be just as true as Jim drank beer for a minute. 
 To take another kind of example, France is a hexagonal republic is somehow 
weird in way that France is hexagonal and France is a republic is not. Prima facie, 
this asymmetry is at odds with the idea that a sentence of the form ‘France is Φ’ is 
true iff the satisfier of ‘France’ satisfies ‘Φ’, and that hexagonal republic is satisfied 
by x iff x satisfies both hexagonal and republic. I don’t expect these simple illus-
trations to convince. Arguing against truth conditional semantics requires 
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discussion of many specific constructions, and the many potential replies.17 But it 
isn’t hard to get a feel for the general Cartesian worry, to which any nativist 
should be sensitive — viz., that i-expressions are concept–construction-
instructions whose basic architecture is determined by endogenous constraints, 
not the language-independent world; cf. Chomsky (2000a).  
 Humans are lucky to have HFL, a faculty that lets us acquire I-languages in 
conditions of limited experience, and then use i-expressions that are 
compositional in some sense that is compatible with both the nature of HFL and 
the concepts we lexicalize. If i-expressions are also compositional in a truth-
theoretic sense, then the demands of HFL and infant psychology somehow 
conspire to yield I-languages that are relevantly like the languages that Frege and 
Tarski designed to be truth-theoretically compositional. That sounds, to my ear, 
like wishful thinking. I’ll return to this point after a brief detour. 
 
 
2. Speculation: Lexicalization as a Human Cognitive Tool 
 
If my proposed account of semantic composition is roughly on the right track, it 
invites a non-standard conjecture about what makes HFL distinctively human. 
 Consider two theses, at least one of which is presumably true. 
 
 (L) Humans have a special capacity to lexicalize mental representations. 
 (C) Humans have a special capacity to combine mental representations. 
 
Perhaps both are true. But other things equal, one doesn’t want to posit two 
distinctively human capacities that somehow manage to interact in the right 
ways. Thesis (C) has a distinguished heritage; see Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 
(2002) for a recent discussion. It can seem obvious that recursion is the key to 
human language. But as Chomsky (1957) famously discussed, there’s recursion, 
and then there’s recursion. A mere concatenater of atomic expressions can 
generate arbitrarily many complex expressions of the form α^β; and non-human 
animals can surely concatenate at least some representations.  
 I suspect that other animals also have the basic capacities required to treat 
concatenations as Conjunctivist instructions: Do this, do that, and connect the 
results with something like an AND-gate. It seems obvious that nonhuman 
animals have many concepts — or if you prefer, pre-lexical mental represen-
tations — that are at least candidates for lexicalization. In terms of nonlinguistic 
cognitive capacities, our evolutionary cousins are quite impressive, especially 
compared with human infants. And it seems quite plausible that other social 
                                                           
    17 See e.g Stanley (2000, 2002) and Schein (forthcoming); cf. Pietroski (2005b, 2006b). This is not 
to deny the enormous value of extant work done within the framework of truth-conditional 
semantics. Nor is to suggest that a Conjunctivist theory will itself be adequate to capture the 
meanings of i-expressions. On the contrary, a Conjunctivist theory may capture only a 
semantic ‘primal sketch’ that is supplemented by other processes that are not compositional 
in the same way. As with vision, it is hard to say where one faculty/module ends, and 
interfaces to ‘general cognition’ begin. But in my view, talk of truth conditions reflects a mix 
of linguistic factors and other cognitive (or metaphysical) factors that are orthogonal to the 
study of HFL. 
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primates can (when suitably stimulated) come to have some thematic concepts 
corresponding to participation relations exhibited by events and agents/ 
patients/places/times/etc.18 But humans have still more, on at least two fronts, 
even if we set aside the possibility that the concepts humans lexicalize are 
somehow especially lexicalizable. 
 First, as already noted, grammatical combination is asymmetric in a way 
that mere concatenation is not. Following Hornstein (in press), I have suggested 
that labeling is the source of this asymmetry; see also Boeckx (2008). Given 
labeled phrases, grammatical relations like ‘being the internal/external argument 
of’ can serve as devices for invoking thematic relations, and thereby distingui-
shing the significance of mere concatenation from the significance of I-language 
combination. But one might wonder: If labeling is all it takes to unleash the power 
of HFL from antecedently available animal capacities, why don’t many species 
have analogs of HFL? 
 This leads to the second point, which is that the cognitive value of I-
languages is limited if there are only a few lexical i-concepts. If only a few atomic 
concepts can be fetched, for purposes of creating complex concepts, recursively 
generating concept construction instructions won’t do much good. So especially 
if concatenation signifies an elementary cognitive operation, which by itself only 
allows for simple cases of concept composition, it may be that lexicalization is the 
key new linguistic trick. Though correlatively, the utility of abstraction 
mechanisms that pair lexicalizable concepts with i-concepts may depend on a 
capacity to efficiently combine i-concepts via independently available operations. 
Perhaps some ancestral primates fortunately connected a capacity to label 
concatenations (or otherwise introduce some such source of grammatical 
asymmetry) with a capacity for formal abstraction that allowed for lexicalization 
(i.e. the creation of i-concepts, not mere pairs of signals with pre-lexical concepts).  
 Since this already seems like a lot to posit, in terms of distinguishing 
humans from other animals, I am wary of also positing a capacity to employ an 
operation like function-application (concept-saturation) recursively. By contrast, 
conjunction appears to be a simple and ubiquitous computation. Moreover, 
whatever we say about the significance of combination, we are faced with the 
empirical fact that human children naturally lexicalize with a vengeance; whereas 
other animals can ‘only’ learn to pair signals with concepts to a certain extent, 
given lots of explicit training. So returning to theses (L) and (C), we have 
independent evidence in favor of (L), making it undesirable to also posit (C). And 
other things equal, I would rather not say that other primates have a (perhaps 
unused) capacity to construe concatenations as recursive instructions to fetch and 
saturate polyadic concepts of arbitrary adicity.  
 Given that Conjunctivism seems to have a chance of yielding descriptive 
adequacy, I conclude that we should explore the possibility that lexicalization is a 
large part of the uniquely human aspect of HFL — and that i-concepts are 
monadic because conjoining monadic concepts is a common cognitive capacity 
that can be used in novel and fruitful ways, once existing concepts are paired 
with (monadic) i-concepts. From this perspective, I-languages impose a common 
                                                           
    18 See Hurford (2007) for relevant and congenial discussion of various evolutionary issues. 
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and simple format on animal concepts, with the result that human i-concepts can 
be combined via simple operations. This may have real value in terms of 
computational efficiency.  
 It may also be occasionally useful for purposes of representing the world. 
But on the whole, one would predict what one actually sees when looking at I-
languages in any detail: Many features (as in expressions like bald linguists who 
like blue skies) that seem like quirks, and often serious design flaws, if one 
assumes that expressions have compositionally determined Tarskian satisfaction 
conditions; and many features, like invocation of thematic roles, that make sense 
if one assumes that expressions are compositional in a more simple-minded, less 
world-directed way.  
 Again, I don’t expect this compressed argument to convince. But the idea is 
that if Conjunctivism turns out to be the best account of semantic composition — 
and of how it came to pass that the biological world includes semantically 
compositional I-languages — then that is itself an argument against truth 
conditional semantics, given the plausible assumption that there are no 
Conjunctivist theories of truth for I-languages.  
 More generally, we should evaluate semantic externalism and other high-
level theses about meaning in light of our best proposals concerning (i) the 
significance of the operation COMBINE, and (ii) how humans came to have a 
faculty in which this operation has that significance. Even if my proposal is 
entirely wrong in detail, I hope to have illustrated how a cluster of theses like (1)–
(5) can hang together. 
 
(1) Meanings are instructions to build concepts. 
(2) Concatenation signifies predicate-conjunction. 
(3) Grammatical relations invoke thematic relations and ∃-closure. 
(4) Lexicalization is a partly creative process of abstraction. 
(5) Meanings are internalistic properties of expressions.  
 
For we can and should ask how alternative clusters compare, if only to loosen the 
current grip of various semantic dogmas on our collective theoretical imagi-
nation. 
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